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2Global Coffee and Decolonisation in Kenya:
Overproduction, Quotas and Rural Restructuring
David Hyde1
(University of East London)
This account departs from the global crisis of the coffee commodity and its impact on the
???????????????????????fee industry during the Emergency. Following the collapse of prices in
?????? ???? ????????? ??????????? ??????? ??????????????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????????? ????
post-war price increases. After a period of contraction, the acreage under cultivation and the
numbers of European farmers entering coffee production expanded, facilitated by the
????????????? ?????????? ??? ??????? ???? ?????????? ??? ??????????? ???????? ???? ????-war boom
brought continued expansion giving a growth rate of 13 percent a year between 1947 and
1954.2 The demand for coffee kept well ahead of supply and led to peak prices in 1955. By
the mid-???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
period became one of deepening financial crisis for most coffee-producing countries brought
on by a decline in the price of their major export. In Kenya, this crisis compounded the debt
burden of the colonial government, which mounted faster than its ability to meet the costs of
the Mau Mau Emergency.3? ???????? ????????? ?????????t found itself coping with the
unforeseen consequences of previous developments in the international economy, which had
vastly increased supplies of coffee on world markets, and which, under conditions of falling
prices and insufficient demand, threatened to downsize the resources for its budgets and debt
servicing. This crisis posed an immediate threat to the principle of fiscal self-sufficiency and
had a direct impact on the approach to decolonisation and the displacement of the settlers out
of coffee production.
From then on, the colonial government, in a bid to save its tax base, was compelled to
promote the African peasant producer, who could cultivate high quality coffee much more
cheaply. Unrelenting global market pressures compelled the colonial government to
rationalise and restructure landownership and beckon African farmers into coffee production
in an effort to sustain its tax base. Even while much of their income was confiscated by the
Coffee Marketing Board (CMB), African farmers were well able to rally family labour and
achieve surpluses. This restructuring was envisioned as crucial to the survival of the industry
and to generating the tax revenues that were desperately required to sustain the fiscal base of
1 The author is Lecturer in Development Studies at the University of East London. The resources to further
develop this and other work were made possible as a result of a Henry Chapman Fellowship at the Institute of
Commonwealth Studies, University of London (UEL) for which I am grateful. I would like to acknowledge UEL
for releasing me to undertake three months of fieldwork in Kenya to complete the research for this paper and
other work.
2 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, cited in B. Berman & J. Lonsdale, Unhappy Valley:
Conflict in Kenya and Africa, London: James Currey, 1992, p.242.
3 Between 1952 and 1959 at least £55 million was spent on containing Mau Mau, quite apart from the wide range
of invisible costs involved (Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-
Colonialism, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975, p.41). The link between increased
debt and static or falling revenues hit Kenya hard during the 1930s, when the ratio of debt charges to gross
revenue rose from 18% in 1926 to 34 per cent in 1934 (P. J. Cain & Anthony G. Hopkins, British Imperialism
1688-2000, London: Longman, 2001). The burden of debt repayment increased during a period of low prices for
primary commodity exports, when earnings were reduced. The increased financial burden brought on by falling
prices for primary commodity exports was severely compounded by the rising costs of the colonial war against
Mau Mau.
3the colonial state. Changes in the organisation and regulation of the commodity chain, which
were globally driven, were decisive in reconfiguring the economic and social relationships
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????my during the transition to independence and beyond. Overall, the colonial
state writhed its way to flag independence through this crisis paroxysm.
?????????????? ??????????????????????
In 1933 global coffee prices4 had collapsed after Brazil had released its surpluses onto world
markets. Prices fell to their lowest level of the interwar period during 1935-9, causing
????????????????????????? ??? ????? ??? ????????????? ???? ?????????? percent of the then 40,000
acres under plantings out of production. This hit the colonial government hard as its revenues
contracted, increasing its ratio of debt charges to gross income from 18 percent in 1926 to 34
percent in 1934.5 Following the 1930s depression, ??????????????????????????????????????????
was lifted by wartime price supports and post-war price increases. The acreage under
cultivation and the numbers of European farmers entering coffee production expanded
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
The post-war boom brought a period of lusty growth for the colonial economy, with
an overall growth rate of 13 percent a year between 1947 and 1954.6?????????GDP rose from
an estimated £24.3 million in 1938, with 49.8 percent of this figure recorded as market
transactions in the monetary sector of the economy, to £150.7 million by 1952 with 70.1
percent recorded transactions.7 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????bulk
of which came from European estates and plantations, grew rapidly and steadily throughout
this period. ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
crucial role to play in aiding and sustaining the British economy during its post war recovery
??????? ???????? ???? ????????? ????????? ????????????? ??? ?????????? ????r African colonies, the
systematic large-scale production of export crops was accelerated to enable Britain to repay
loans and credits to the US through sales in dollar-earning markets. Nonetheless, the increased
export earnings of these crops after 1945 was largely a function of the rapid rise of world
market prices.
Global demand for coffee kept well ahead of supply and led to peak prices in 1955,
but thereafter markets became saturated making the ensuing period one of serious cyclical
downturn characterised by falling prices. This was paralleled by the end of the post war
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
U.S. in place of the surpluses which had made them such a vital part of the Sterling Area in
the crucial period of reconstruction following 1945. In Kenya, this turnaround threatened to
downsize the budgetary resources of the state, a problem which compounded the
????????????? ????? ??????? ?????? ???????? ??????? ????? ???? ???????? ??? ?????? ???? ?????? ??? the
colonial war against Mau Mau.8 Between 1952-9 at least £55 million was directly spent on
containing the insurgency, quite apart from the wide range of invisible costs involved. The
4 Kathleen Stahl, The Metropolitan Organisation of British Colonial Trade, London: Faber & Faber, 1951,
pp.248-9.
5 S. Herbert Frankel, Capital Investment in Africa [1938], pp.178, 181-3 , cited in Cain Hopkins (2001), p.584.
6 IBRD, The Economic Development of Kenya, Baltimore: IBRD, 1963, p.340.
7 H. W. ????????????????????????????????????????-??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
paper presented at Political Economy of Colonial Kenya conference, Cambridge, 1975, p.3.
8 Leys (1975), p.41.
4???????? ??????? ??????????? ???? ????????? ??????? ????-sufficiency and directly impacted on the
approach of decolonization, and the displacement of many settlers out of coffee production
which accompanied it.
By the mid-1950s, East African producers had expanded their output to approximately
6 percent???? ?????????????????????????tion, whereupon it fell upon a shrinking market. The
Latin American producers continued to increase their stocks and the prospect of an economic
catastrophe following the release of their surpluses overshadowed the market. The price
meltdown following such a move would have deeply devalued the Kenyan economy, put
thousands of acres out of production ? as had happened in the 1930s ? and plunged the
country into recession during its transition to independence. The haunting spectre of the 1930s
dominated the fears and apprehensions of the government and the settlers.
The Kenyan economy had become linked more directly with British capitalism during
its post war recovery phase. However, by the end of the 1950s Kenya was no longer protected
by, or restrained to trading within, the Sterling Area and was much more exposed to the
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
economy, based on coffee, tea and sisal, had a crucial role to play in aiding the recovery of the
British economy during the immediate post war period. As with the expanded resource
????????????? ??? ?????????? ?????? ???????? ?????????? ???? ??????????? ?????-scale production of
plantation crops was accelerated to assist the recreation of industrial capital in Britain. This
was largely a labour-??????????????????????????? ?????? ????????????? ????????? ????????????????
the terms of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act (1940) was allocated to fund the
minimal requirements of capital depreciation of essential infrastructure (such as the railways)
in order to sustain the colonial export drive. While there was a ?rapid expansion? of banking
and financial institutions in the colony during this period, commercial banks provided only a
decreasing amount of the capital requirements of agriculture.9? ???????????????????????????????
local lending flowed into short-term commercial credit to finance imports. Financing for
estate and plantation production was increasingly met by a range of government bodies,
namely the Board of Agriculture through its rehabilitation and development funds, the
European Agricultural Settlement Board and the Land and Agricultural Bank. By 1955, the
commercial banks were pursuing a conscious policy of disengagement from long term loans
to European farmers generally.10
???? ??????????? ??? ?????????? ????? ???????? ????????? ??????? ???? ??????????? ???? ?????
African producers responded to the falling prices of export commodities such as cocoa and
groundnuts by increasing output. In Kenya, settler farmers had reduced their output and taken
thousands of coffee acres out of production. These problems resurfaced as long-term
structural problems in African economies began to reveal the limits to further export
expansion without an agricultural revolution. The colonial government seized the initiative to
embark on a programme of rural restructuring and social engineering of an indigenous
bourgeoisie though at the cost of displacing the settlers.
European plantation production struggled to endure the crisis conditions of the 1950s
and would have to change fundamentally to stand any chance of survival. This was a crucial
issue that struck at the heart of the colonial economy. Without the export revenues accruing
9 Michael McWil?????????????????????????????-???????East African Economics Review, 9:1, (1962), pp.18 &
24.
10 R. M. A. van Zwanenberg & A. King, An Economic History of Kenya and Uganda, 1800-1970, London:
Macmillan, 1975, p.294; McWilliam (1962), p.33.
5from a handful of primary commodities, most especially coffee, the colonial government
faced dire economic straits at a time when its costs had risen sharply to meet the demands of
the Emergency. The role of the state in securing the conditions of capital accumulation
extended to sacrificing those sections of coffee capital that were uncompetitive and thus
unable to support its tax base. This involved the local mediation and management of this
global crisis by the colonial state that passed its shock waves on to the industry in Kenya,
which took the form of restructuring and social engineering of the coffee sector in order to
save a major component of its tax resources.
It is important to grasp how these problems were managed under conditions which
were dominated by this crisis together with the political crisis within the colony brought on by
the war against Mau Mau at this time. The durability of the state and the capacity of the
economy to weather such cyclical crisis tendencies were severely tested and found wanting.
The role of the state and its ability to restructure the industry by drawing in African producers
was passed off as a favour of liberalising late colonialism, but which was actually crucial to
the survival of the state and the cash-crop production on which it was dependent for a large
part of its revenues.
????? ??????? ??? ???? ??????????? ???? ????????? ??? ???????? ????? ?????????? ???????
commodity threatened the dislocation of the very foundations of the industry, and would
make itself felt throughout the entire superstructure of the colonial government???????????????
payments from farmers and tax revenues, from the export sales of coffee, made pivotal
contributions to its budget. The loss of these threatened to make themselves felt if the industry
were allowed to shrink and shrivel. The industry worldwide was going through a period of
profound upheaval and was compelled to restructure in Kenya to take its chances on survival.
As the industry shifted towards smaller scale peasant production under the Swynnerton Plan,
the plantation companies and African coffee farmers made gains at the expense of the small to
medium size settler estates whose economies of scale made them uncompetitive. The
powerful emergence of the small scale farmer was accompanied by tight and strict monopoly
control over coffee production by the Coffee Board of Kenya (CBK) and marketing by the
Coffee Marketing Board (CMB), which became a dominant feature of the industry.11
The state played a crucial role in securing the conditions of capital accumulation,
including availability of and access to free markets. The coffee market, as elsewhere, was
dysfunctional in Kenya having fallen upon a phase of serious disequilibrium within the world
???????? ????? ???? ???? ??????? ??? ???? ????????? ????????????? ????????????? ??? ?????????? ????
planters at the al??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
The state was consequently faced with uprooting its erstwhile biases and abandoning all
previous favour and protection granted to the planters. We can now begin to understand the
government?s pressing concern and intimate involvement with the problems of coffee
???????????? ?????? ???? ????????? ??? ???????? ????? ?????????? ????????? ?????????? ????????????
material means for nourishing the state machine and paying? ???? ??????????? ????-produ???????
workers, most especially the various departments of its coercive apparatus that had greatly
???????????????????????????? ??? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
any commitment to underwrite the costs of production through subsidies to the industry.
11 The CBK was the government body which regulated and supervised the coffee sector. It worked closely with
the CMB, which acted as a marketing agent. The CBK did not buy coffee from the farmers but acted solely as
an agent, so the coffee still belonged to the farmers up to the point of sale at auction. It was against the law for
producers to market their own coffee. The CMB had statutory powers that made it responsible for the disposal of
all grades of Kenya coffee by public auction, with the exception of coffee that was sold locally.
6Indeed, it was looking at ways to raise extra revenue to ease its financial burden, and this
involved further impositions on the industry. As early as 1957 the Board of Agriculture had
warned settler farmers that they could not be shielded ?against the effects occasioned by the
present shortage both of revenue to finance current needs and of loan funds for
?????????????12 To make matters worse, the government had cut back its financial assistance
just at a time when farmers needed it most.13
Whilst the government endeavoured to show some appearance of support for the
industry (principally by the provision of extension staff, such as instructors to supervise
factory work, teach growers and help for newly emerging cooperatives), it insisted that this
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
raise revenue, set at 5 percent of the value of clean coffee to provide extension services, and
???????? ???? ????????????? ???? ????????? ?????????? ?? ????? percent export tax was also
subtracted from the planters? receipts, a measure that provoked a large section of them to
close ranks and to found the Kenya Coffee Growers Association (KCGA) with the result that
the tax was revoked in 1957. Increased taxes came at a time when returns to the planters were
variable and unpredictable. Deductions from coffee revenues to pay for the security forces
were a major bone of contention. It was widely believed that for every eight bags of coffee
picked, the government took one to help pay for the Emergency.
In another blow to coffee growers, legislation to end the system by which producers
had been permitted to average their profit over a number of years for income-tax assessment
was passed by the Central Legislative Assembly. The Commissioner for Income Tax ?pointed
out that for 15 or 16 years coffee farmers had benefited from a relief arrangement which had
not applied to other tax payers whose incomes had fluctuated?.14 Through this the government
was relinquishing its protection of the industry, exposing it entirely to the fluctuations of the
world market.
Forty Kiambu coffee growers assembled to express strong opposition to Finance
????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
tha?? ???? ????????????????????????????????? ??? ?????????? ???? ????? ??? ?????? ??????????. They
drew up their own proposal for a tax rate which ?should not exceed? twelve shillings in the
pound, with exemptions for undistributed and development expenditure. It also emerged that
those planters who had bought coffee farms in recent years had raised loans on an expected
rate of return that had all but collapsed. If the tax proposals were implemented ?it would be
impossible for planters to meet their obligations to those who had sold the farms??15 and they
would have to close their mortgages. A resolution was agreed and forwarded to the Nairobi
coffee conference in July 1958, which called for an independent inquiry into the budget
proposals ?with a view to ending the need for such high taxation?.16 The conference vocalised
the grievances of settler farmers and planters everywhere. To placate the outcry the CBK
acknowledged that ?planters were perturbed at the rate of the tax??17 and set up a committee to
look into the controversial deduction. This was the first of many conflicts with the state
machine that faced its own economic malaise over the costs of the Emergency and was
prepared to squeeze, and ultimately sacrifice, the planters and others to pay for it. These
12 Kenyan National Archives (KNA), Department of Agriculture Annual Reports, 1952-68.
13 East African Standard (EAS?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????
14 EAS?????????????????????????????????????? ??????????
15 EAS?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
16 EAS??????????????????????????????????-?????????????????????????????????????????
17 EAS?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
7problems surfaced again over a further budget proposal for an undistributed income tax at the
rate of fifteen shillings in the pound. Even the CBK protested that the Income Tax
[Management] Bill would prevent smaller planters from accumulating the financial reserves
necessary to shield themselves against the almost certain prospect of ?a serious drop in prices
during the next few years?.18 The significance of the Bill was that the government was no
longer able or willing to give even the semblance of favour and protection to European
growers.
Coffee in the Balance of Trade
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? The
annual average foreign exchange earned by coffee during 1955-57 was $31m whilst all other,
mainly agricultural, exports grossed $45m. During this period the prices for agricultural
primary products and raw materials generally were falling in the world market, while the
prices for imports, normally manufactured commodities, had been rising. The terms of trade
throughout the period 1956-67 were generally unfavourable to Kenya. During 1954-56, three
successive annual coffee crops in Kenya had averaged 20,000 tons and the industry had
generated an income of £28,328,300 our of total agricultural export earnings valued at
£67,556,070. In 1956, a peak crop of 26,711 tons was raised and increased exports of coffee
????? ????????? ??????? ??????????????? ??????????????????? ??? ??????????????????????????????????
exports. The Department of Agriculture annual report recorded a rise in coffee exports from
£8,926,908 to £13,674,568, bringing the total value of agricultural exports to £26,178,121. By
1956, then, at the close of a peak period for the commodity, coffee accounted for more than
????? ???? ?????? ??????????? ????????????? ???orts. Thereafter its contribution to the balance of
trade began to slide.
The Kenyan economy overall suffered a 13 percent overall reduction in trade during
the first nine months of 1957. Agricultural exports fell in value to £23,446,278 with the bulk
of the fall attributed to coffee, whose value fell to £10,812,281. Even though the 1957 crop
fetched on average £25 a ton more than in 1956, the latter was a peak crop at 4,427 tons in
excess of the subsequent year. Overall, plummeting sales caused a 35.5 percent reduction in
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????19
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????n
coffee was at its most intense at a time when other world producers were also competing to
improving the quality of their coffees.20 Even though West Germany (which by 1962 was
???????? ???????? ???????? had bought £4,500,000 worth of higher grade coffees during the
1956-57 season, Hamburg buyers gave notice that only if its ?quality standards? were
maintained? ?????? ???????? ???????? ?be assured of a good market reception?.21 During the
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
18 EAS????????????????????????????- proposed tax rate penal t??????????????????????????????????????
19 National Archives, Kew, CO/544/ Department of Agriculture Annual Reports, Appendix 35.
20 Kenyan coffee was considered one of the best on the market because of its fine quality and had fetched higher
prices than its main competitor ? Arabica coffee from Brazil. It had been a mainstay of the speciality coffee
market in Europe and the US, and a key component for roasters seeking to add acidity and sweetness to their
blends.
21 EAS,???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
8further into question, 22 as, according to the CBK????????????????????????????????????far below
that on which its name had been built?. ????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ????? ??????? ????? ???
22,284 tons were sold at £453 a ton, with a total value of nearly £4 million. In a falling
market, West Germany was still its best customer, paying premium prices at the auctions
?????? ?????? ?? ??????? ???????? ????? ?? ????? ????? ???? ??????????????? ????????????????????
dependent on a few large buyers and the failure of a single one of these to purchase ??????????
???????????.23 ???????? ???? ????????? ???????? ???????? ??? ????? ????? ?? ????? ???? ????? ??? ????
previous ???????????????????????????????a shortfall of more than 20 percent.
During 1958-59, the CBK paid out more than £10m. to farmers for sales on a crop in
excess of 30,000 tons, though this was sold at a lower average price than the previous year. In
the year ending September 1960, Kenya exported £10,623,979 worth of coffee, making it by
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? a
lower average price. Paradoxically, spurred on by the lifting of restrictions on African coffee
production, the crop was rapidly expanding as more than 110,000 African growers were
producing alongside 1,200 European farms and plantations. Nonetheless, whilst greater
quantities of the crop were being sold, it was still far away from recovering its peak prices of
1955-56.
Globally, the fiscal year 1956-57 ended with world supply and demand at a rough
equilibrium, though there was a surplus of nine million bags of unsold coffee, two thirds of
this belonging to Brazil. These unsold surpluses were carried over into the following year to
be set against rising production and stringent international quotas, causing a worsening
problem and a driving force for deeper crisis. As governments responded to these pressures
with subsidies to underwrite the burden of those planters who had failed to sell their crops, the
currencies of the main producers began to show the signs of strain.
The proceedings of the annual Nairobi coffee conference held in July 1957 were
dominated by this global crisis. Delegates from the CBK and the CMB expressed anxieties
over falling sales and plans to re-establish????????????-eminent position in the British market,
now a mere 6 per cent, were discussed. The loss of British markets was compounded by the
unease over threats to Kenyan producers emanating from protectionist measures of the newly
formed European Economic Community (EEC). This took the form of a 16 percent levy on
coffees coming from overseas territories unattached to the six states of the EEC. This was a
major setback since a large portion of East African coffee, as well as other commodities, were
sold in the Common Market Area. There were particular fears about the loss of markets for
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
grades whilst Britain and the USA were the main buyers of the ordinary grades.
???????????????????? ?????????????????
The dilemmas facing the industry and the government were illustrated by Michael Blundell in
his address to the annual conference of the Kenya National Farmers Union (KNFU) in
Nairobi in May 1958. He emphasised that the ?most damaging blow to the economy as a
whole has been the steep fall in coffee prices?. The world market had been temporarily
22 ???????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
23 EAS,??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
9stabilised only by withholding the entry of large scale Latin American reserve stocks. In the
case of Brazil, this was its weapon to uphold its larger claims on the market and to browbeat
smaller producers. This had been at the expense of building up even larger excesses in the
forthcoming year, which Blundell estimated would exceed 27 million bags as against a world
annual consumption of 38 million bags. This was later underlined by a report issued by the
United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation, which estimated world coffee production
for 1958-59 at 3.3 million metric tonnes, 9 percent higher than the previous year.24 Blundell
drew attention to the support the Government derived from the coffee industry and that ?it
was reluctant to enter a qu???? ??????? ??? ??????? ????????????25 as was proposed by the US
????????????? ??????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????????????. This stance was founded on the
assumption, reinforced by the experience of the 1930s, that rising coffee production amongst
African farmers would place the industr????????????????????????????????the challenge of falling
prices??26 since their costs of production were much lower than European plantation and estate
production.
In full knowledge of the g????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????? ??????????? ??? ?????????? ????????? ?????????? ????? ???? ??????????? ??? ???? ???????????
years when African farmers in other colonies were urged to produce their way out of the
crisis. This only made sense as part of a strategy to un-ban African coffee production and
pressurise settlers to reduce their overheads. Following past experience, it was assumed that
African farmers and their families would work longer and more labour intensively and be
prepared to wait for their payment in the knowledge that the crop was their own.
Alternatively, for European coffee producers to achieve lower costs would mean the
application of new technology to production, which was tied to a considerable outlay of
capital at a time when many planters were strapped. Compelled to forego this course, most
European planters opted for low wage, labour-intensive productivity which was in fact the
course taken.
????????? ???????? ??? ???? ?????????????? ??? ???????? ????????????? ???? warned that the
????????? ??????? ?????????? ?????? ?????????? ??? ???????? ????? ???ces only if we maintain
quality?.27 This strategy went hand in hand with increased quantity of production, though with
the risk that the intensified labour process and increased productivity would result in lower
quality thus compromising sales. Blundell well knew that the industry had to undergo a
profound restructuring in order to survive, and that many European coffee farmers would go
to the wall. This was the price of saving the industry that Blundell was privately resigned to, a
reluctant acquiescence to compelling necessities.
???? ????????????? ??????? ??? ?double Kenya??? ??????? ??????????? was an attempt to
compensate itself for falling export revenues and crippling deductions from its tax base.28
Why was Blundell urging planters to step up production during a crisis of overproduction?
The financial solvency of the state machine depended on tax remittances from the coffee
industry. Diminishing returns and a depressed industry would hit government revenues at a
time when the expenses of the Emergency were making large claims on government revenues,
and threaten social and political instability during an oncoming period of fragile transition.
24 EAS,????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
25 ????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
bring this compulsion along with it.
26 EAS,??????????????????????????????????????????????-?????????????????????????????????????, 13 November 1958.
27 EAS,?????????????????????????????????????????????????-?????????????????????????, 28 May 1958.
28 EAS,?????????????????????????- ?????????????????????????????????? ?????????, 25 October 1958.
10
Thus the CBK advanced its consumerist solu????? ??? ???????? ????????????? ?? ???????????
release of some surplus stocks in order to lower prices and expand sales. Whilst this was
calculated to ease the pressure on producers, it put wide layers of settlers at risk compelling
them to sell off their coffee at below its costs of production. The CMB made a virtue of
falling world prices, arguing that this would encourage consumption and discourage
production. The CMB??? ????????? ???????? ????? ??????????? ???? ??? ?????????? ?????? ??? ???????
coffee prices, which would ?come quickly enough?. Until the arrival of this scenario, East
Africa ??????? ???? ????????. If surplus stocks were released the prices of all coffees would
tumble ?ve???????????. The CMB????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
by reducing supplies, restricting production and new plantings, and through stimulating
demand to soak up surpluses.29 The end result would be the restoration of equilibrium within
the industry. During December 1958 the crisis deteriorated further as the prices of lower to
medium grades of Kenyan coffee entered into the anticipated slide and ended down by £20 to
£30 a ton, with losses estimated at ??????????????????. Prevarication had lent the initiative to
the unconscious interplay of the market. This prompted a pervasive desperation all round to
resolve the crisis of overproduction. The East African Coffee Roasting Association vocalised
its position that nothing less would do than to drop prices,30 while Brooke Bond responded
without warning and reduced their prices by as much as 80 cents a pound in a bid to shrink
their competitors.
With the approach of the 1959-60 season, the Latin American producers came forward
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Leone should limit their exports to 1,949,000 bags.31 The chairman of both the CMB and the
?????? ?????????? ??-operative Union (KPCU),32 R. S. Wollen, was categorical in an
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
sch??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
was the cheaper coffees that were in ?oversupply?. Wollen led the conference into denial that
the crisis even touched them, ?confident that however much coffee is released in the world we
shall always be able to sell our total production and at some premium for quality???????????
producers should not be swayed by the threat of catastrophe, since the quality of their coffees
was above the rest. This was the position of a significant lobby which favoured going it alone.
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
develop the potential market amongst Africans in Kenya for cheap coffee. Market outlets in
Rhodesia and South Africa were also being explored. In reality though these options were
??????? ??????? ???????? ?? ??????????? ?????????????? ???????? ???????????? ????? ??? ????? ??? ????
slender thread held by German buyers. Even so, Wollen was ??????????????????? that if Brazil
29 EAS,?????????????????????????????????????????????????-?????????????????????????????, 21 November 1958.
30 EAS,????????????????????????????????????-?????????????????????????, 2 December 1958.
31 EAS,????????????????????????????- threat to output from East Africa??????????????.
32 The KPCU was a country wide co-operative owned and managed entirely by coffee growers through a board
of directors. It was founded in 1937 and was originally known as Thika Planters Co-operative Union whose
purpose was to purchase supplies for its members. In 1945, after World War II, the Government of Kenya
enacted a new co-operative ordinance. This enabled the KPCU to acquire the entire agency business for the co-
operative society sector of the coffee industry. Its membership comprised all coffee co-operatives and over 90%
of coffee estates. In 1947, the KPCU completed its milling monopoly by purchasing the mills of the East African
Coffee Curing Company, which was an amalgamation of several small mills, which incorporated coffee milling,
liquoring and storage. The main role of the KPCU was to mill and grade parchment coffee from estates and
societies. It also provided advice on coffee husbandry, agricultural inputs such as fertilizers and machinery, short
term credit, transit and warehousing, receiving and channelling payment to members together with education and
information to coffee growers. The KPCU paid farmers through a pool system, sale proceeds were combined
before determining the final average rate to pay farmers. Payments were made after deducting marketing
expenses incurred by the Coffee Board of Kenya and the final price was the same for all farmers.
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were to release her surpluses onto the world market ?the fall in the price of all coffees would
be catastrophic?.33
As further talks got under away in Washington on the adoption of the 1959-60 global
marketing agreement, new proposals were advanced for an increased export quota of
40,272,000 bags matched against an estimated annual world consumption of 38,000,000
bags.34 In addition to existing surplus stocks, such an excess of supply over demand would
almost certainly keep prices in the doldrums. The Latin American producers led by Brazil
manoeuvred to lure the Africans into a world-wide quota agreement that they would
dominate. There were also signs of brinkmanship between the warring factions. Whilst both
would sink amidst an economic collapse, this did not prevent either from taunting the other
with the prospect of such a disaster in order to extract more of the quota for themselves. The
CMB, with its head still in the sand, believed that African producers had significant leverage
over their Latin American rivals and that Brazil would not seek ?to prompt such a disaster??
Nonetheless, there was more than a little suspicion amongst the East African producers that
the provisions of the proposed pact did ?not augur entirely well? for them. There was deep
resentment at a ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
their produce ?just to prote??? ???? ????????????? ????? ??????? sought by the Latin American
producers.35 A leading settler politician, Bruce Mackenzie, cautioned against complacency
and warned that the prospect of Brazil offloading its stockpiles, accumulating at a million tons
a year, onto world markets was a very real one.36
Finally an agreement on export quotas was reached following a surprise abject
capitulation by the East African producers in which they settled to withhold 54,000 bags from
the market, more than double the previous figure. What had changed to coax them into
signing such a deal? A new dimension to the pact was introduced that excluded any new
markets developed by the producing countries from the export quotas.37 But would non-quota
markets be enough to soak up the surpluses of rising production? This problem was
highlighted by figures released by the US Department of Agriculture that forecasted record
production levels of African coffee,38 estimated at 10.6 million bags for 1959-60, of which
10.1 million would be exportable, 5 percent above the previous year.39 The situation worsened
in the following year as the East African producers became full members of the International
Coffee Agreement (ICA) and forfeited their right to restrict their exports voluntarily. They
were now strictly bound by ICA export quotas, which were revised downward by 200,000 to
2,380,000 bags for 1960-61 under circumstances where prices had been falling ?throughout
the season for all grades and classes?, a trend compounded by the general poor quality of the
??????????????40
??????? ??????? ????????? ????? ????? ???? ????????????? ??????? ????? ?????? ?????? ?not
contemplate any direct control of production, whatever long term world agreement was
concluded in future?.41 In promoting Arabica as ?an excellent cash crop for the African
33 EAS,?????????????????????????????????????????????- assured market for quality goods????????????????
34 EAS,????????????????????????????????????, 24 June 1959.
35 EAS,????????????????????????, 26 August 1959.
36 EAS,??????????????????????????????????????????????, 2 September 1959.
37 EAS,????????????????????????????????????, 26 September 1959.
38 By 1960, Uganda was producing 118,000 tonnes of Arabica. It was by this time the largest producer in the
????????????????????????????????????????????????????
39 EAS,??????????????????????????????????????- U.S. Repo???, 30 September 1959.
40 EAS,???????????????????????????????????????????????????, 10 December 1960.
41 EAS,???????????????????????????????????????????????????, 10 December 1960.
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smallholder??42????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in a stronger position to keep their production costs low. This would enable the CMB to sell
larger quantities of coffee in non-quota markets with less fear of the commodity being sold off
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
open the gates even wider to broader layers of African farmers to engage in coffee production.
Blundell was only willing to go along with quotas if the reduction ?was not too great?, even
while he believed that the rate of expansion in Kenya coffee growing had to be maintained so
that p????????????????????????????????upward swing in the coffee cycle?.
??????????? ????????? ???? ????? ??????? ????? ??????????? ????? ???? ?????????? ??? ???????
production since, to come through the other side of this difficult period, the industry had to be
carried by African farmers until prices had climbed out of their trough and lifted the fittest
European producers, able to survive the trials and tribulations of low prices. Blundell
envisioned an industry in which there was room for both low cost Africans producers and
rationalised European producers able to invest in new technology and trim their businesses to
the vagaries of the market.
In conjunction with the course towards the smallholder, Blundell was hedging the
fortunes of Kenyan growers ?on a complete price collapse of Brazilian Arabicas? in the hope
????? ???????? ???????? ?????? ????? ???? ????? ???? ?could probably continue to command
??????????????? on the strength of its reputed excellence, thus cashing in on the misfortunes
of its rivals. Nonetheless, he was attendant to th?????????????????????? ??????????there was a
danger that the price of even the best qualities would decline precipitously?.43 During 1961,
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Alarm
bells rang at the Nairobi coffee auctions where class 6 coffee sold at an average of 311
shillings per hundredweight, as compared to 366 in the previous season. Was this the
beginning of a meltdown?44 A report published by the Department of Trade and Supplies
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? percent during 1960. This was
almost entirely due to lower coffee prices, so that while coffee exports were 37.8 percent of
???????????????????????????????????????????????45
The recurrent emphasis on quality and productivity surfaced again at the coffee
conference in Nairobi held in July 1961 attended by 55 representatives of coffee organisations
and societies throughout Kenya. Roger Swynnerton, the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry
of Agriculture, echoed the almost constant refrain of coffee industry spokesman with his
sermon of ?sound deve???????? ???? ???????????????????? as crucial to the ?survival of the
coffee industry at a critical time???????????????? ???????? ??????????????increase in advisory
??????????????????????? whilst at the same time keeping ?a close eye? on foreign competitors.
He reminded delegates that while the price of coffee had fallen by £200 a ton during the
previous four years, the industry had managed to sustain itself by exporting more than £10
million worth of coffee, through increasing production by more than nine thousand tons and
by ?preserving quality?.46 Nonetheless, without a larger quota to soak up the surpluses, and in
spite of non-quota markets, such a strategy was storing up inescapable problems for the
future.
42 EAS,???????????????????????????????????????????????????, 10 December 1960.
43 EAS,????????????????????????????-?????????????????????????????????????, 7 May 1961.
44 EAS,?????????????????, 10 May 1961.
45 KNA, Kenya Trade and Supplies Bulletin, June 1961.
46 EAS,??????????????????????????????????????????????- need for more research ????????????????????, 29 July 1961.
13
The International Coffee Agreement: the institutional rebirth of protectionism
During the years 1954-56 the market entered into a period of massive overproduction and a
slump in world prices, related to the simultaneous rise of coffee production throughout Latin
America and Africa. In an attempt to stabilise prices, the Latin Americans signed the Mexico
Agreement in 1957, renewed a year later as the Latin American Agreement. Both were built
upon the need to restrict exports. The expansion of coffee cultivation in Africa, however,
risked the success of an agreement that covered only Latin America. African coffees,
excepting the French colonies, competed with Latin American coffees in all markets ?
including the North American ones. In 1959, African countries participated in the talks that
led to the establishment of an international agreement, which was renewed in 1960 and 1961.
???? ??????? ??? ??????????????? ??????? ???? ????????? ??????????? ???? ??? ???? ?????? ??????
International Coffee Agreement (ICA),47 replacing previous one-year agreements, which
became operable from 1 July 1963 to give some semblance of regulation to the contracting
market and to keep internecine struggles amongst global producers within the boundaries of
order, though these conflicts often threatened to get the better of the ICO, which was set up to
police the agreement. Whilst relationships between producers appeared to be regulated by the
quota system enshrined in the ICA, the superior ???????????????????????????????????????????
leading producers, was dominant.48 The ICA meant that most producing and consuming
countries were signatories to a commonly binding undertaking. Under the agreement, the
international coffee market was subjected to a regulatory control mechanism system, whereby
a target price (or price band) for coffee was set, and export quotas were allocated for each
producer. When the indicator price calculated by the ICO rose over the set price, quotas were
relaxed; when it fell below the set price, quotas were tightened. If prices rose particularly
sharply, quotas were abandoned until prices declined to within the band. Its apparent goal was
to achieve stability of coffee prices through the agreement and policing of quotas, increase the
purchasing power of producer countries and reduce the difficulties caused by surpluses.49
Governments in both producing and consuming countries sought to agree pre-determined
supply levels by setting quotas for producing countries. To prevent oversupply, ICO- member
countries had to agree not to exceed their supply of coffee exports, however if prices rose,
producers were permitted to exceed their quotas to meet the surge in demand. In practice this
meant reducing, containing and placing limits upon competition at a time of low prices when
47?????????????????????????????????:??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
basis which will assure adequate supplies of coffee to consumers and markets for coffee to producers at equitable
prices, and which will bring about long-term equilibrium between production and consumption; (2) to alleviate
the serious hardship caused by burdensome surpluses and excessive fluctuations in the prices of coffee to the
detriment of the interests of both producers and consumers; (3) to contribute to the development of productive
resources and to the promotion and maintenance of employment and income in the Member countries thereby
helping to bring about fair wages, higher living standards, and better working conditions; (4) to assist in
increasing the purchasing power of coffee-exporting countries by keeping prices at equitable levels and by
increasing consumption; (5) to encourage the consumption of coffee by every possible means; (6) in general, in
recognition of the relationship of the trade in coffee to the economic stability of markets for industrial products,
to further international co-?????????????????????????????????????????????????????(International Coffee
Agreement 1962; Chapter I, Article 1. p. 7).
48????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
had significant oil reserves of its own, the oil industry was slow to develop making the country dependent on
petroleum imports from the dollar and sterling areas. This made Brazil very dependent for her foreign income on
the world price of coffee. This made Brazil overbearing and predisposed to exercising its pre-eminent position
within the ICO to get its way and to secure its position at the expense of other producers.
49 A. Kumar, Primary Commodities: International Control of Production and Trade, Ljubljana: Research Centre
for Cooperation with Developing Countries, 1986, p.165.
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producers had to sell more than before in order to keep their heads above water, in what
appeared to many to be a re-run of the depression. Far from alleviating tensions, the quota
system exacerbated them and intensified already existent contradictions. As a consequence of
ICA quotas, coffee plantings in Kenya were temporarily banned until the mid 1970s when the
international prices rose.50 The ICA system was beset with squabbles over quotas from the
start. These threatened to undermine the agreement as an increasing volume of coffee traded
with (or through) non-member importing countries ([at lower prices) or non-quota markets.
The ICO was founded in 1962, in an apparent attempt to overcome the anarchic nature
of the industry worldwide, which had had such disastrous consequences in the 1930s. Its
express purpose was to police the ICA,?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
collapse of the post war primary commodities boom, with the professed aim of softening the
impact of similar crises in future. However, it had a less visible agenda of prioritising the
survival of the strongest producers as the basis of its decisions concerning the distribution of
portions of a contracting market during a period of low prices. This meant in practice
apportioning and policing quotas, and limiting production in a way that tended to give the
greatest advantage and flexibility to the large Latin American producers who were even more
???????? ????????????? ????????? ??????????? than they had been before WW2. It would be a
mistake to see the emergence of the ICO as a sign that the industry was becoming more
organised worldwide.51 Beneath appearances, the industry was becoming more hierarchical,
with economic power becoming highly concentrated into the hands of a few powerful
producers who had the potential to browbeat and hold the smaller and less significant
producers to ransom. In the case of Brazil, its position at the apex of the ICO expressed its
relationship to the concentrated dominion of the USA as its informal satellite.
If anything, the crisis of world overproduction was more universal in its impact and
threatened to hit the industry even harder than in the thirties. The quantities involved were
much greater, and there were more producers pushing to offload their surpluses in a scramble
to meet their costs of production and ensure some workable profit margins. These unbearable
contradictions gave rise to great strains within the ICO, which threatened to tear it apart as it
was perceived as an organisation which operated primarily for the benefit of the large Latin
American producers. The ICO, far from reflecting organised capitalism, institutionalised the
management of anarchy in world coffee production in a system that squeezed the small
producers in order to save the larger ones. The very organisation of the ICO assured the
mutually antagonistic interdependence of all its separate parts.
Protectionism took the contradictory form of the ICO and the quotas imposed on the
signatories of the ICA. These enabled the larger and politically powerful producers to protect
and expand their markets at the expense of weaker rivals. This was accompanied by a
combined transformation in the structure and modus operandi of the industry worldwide,
which had evolved in response the world slump of the 1930s, in which the concentrated
capital dominion of the Latin American producers was able to assert itself more strongly
through quotas biased in their favour. Viewed in this way, the ICA represented a
reinstatement of the protectionism which characterised the inter-war period.
50 J. Heyer et al (eds), Rural Development in Tropical Africa, London: Macmillan, 1981, p.104.
51 Benoit Daviron & Stefano Ponte, The Coffee Paradox: global markets, commodity trade and the elusive
promise of development, London: Zed Books, 2005.
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Whither Kenya?
The crisis of coffee production in late colonial Kenya was a local expression of a crisis that
was worldwide in character, in which cyclical fluctuations intrinsic to capitalist development
showed themselves in an acute manner. The configuration of relationships through which this
was dealt with were largely determined by external shifts in the balance of global imperial,
and sub-imperial, power, which in turn greatly influenced the restructuring of the Kenyan
economy during the late colonial period.
The crisis entered a new phase in September 1961, marked by a sudden deepening of
???? ?????????? ??????????? ??? ?????? ???????? ??? ???? ??????? ??? ???? ???????? ???fee auctions in
Nairobi, class 6 coffee fell dramatically to just 292 shillings per hundredweight, with the
prices of most grades ?generally down?? ??? ???? ????????? ????????? ??????? ???? ?downward
??????52 in world prices was so serious that the ICA appeared to be on the brink of break-up
amidst bitter internal squabbles, with some producers on the verge of breaking ranks. As the
fiction of controlled markets crumbled, political upheavals in Brazil created unease
throughout the ICO that political pressures to re?????????????????????????????????????????????
upper hand. This seems to have intimidated the East African producers into accepting a 3
percent cut in export quotas from 1,468,541 bags in 1960-61 to 1,424,489 in 1961-62. This
curb on exports could only worse?? ???? ????????? ????????? ????????? ??? ?? ???????????????? ????
coffee growers could least afford curtailments on production. The restrictions of the ICA were
hardly able to arrest the crisis as world prices fell still further. The Financial Times in London
beli???????????????????????????????????????????????ue to fall for sometime to come?. The CMB
now resorted to selling even more coffee under the counter in non-quota markets with the
apparent aim of pressurising the dominant producers within the ICO to increase? ????????
quota.53
The prospective price collapse and internecine wars within the ICO generated much
??????? ??? ???????? ???? ??????? ? ???? ??????? ??? ???????? ???????????? ??? ?????????????? ???????
agreements was the subject of talks in London in June 1961 between representatives of the
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to long term agreements and the prolongation of the existing agreement were discussed.
?????????? ????????????? ??? ????? ????????? ???? ??????? ???tainly related to its concern for the
economic and political stability of its colony during the transition to independence.54
R. S. Wollen told Nairobi Rotarians ?that no country on the verge of independence
would weather the economic trouble which would follow a drop in coffee prices?. At current
rates of growth Kenya was likely to double its annual production of 500,000 bags within five
years. Wollen warned that if there was no international agreement, coffee-producing countries
would face a price war and ???????????????????? Kenya would be lucky to sell its crop at a
quarter of the present price. Wollen welcomed the efforts of the Kenyan government towards
???????????? ??? ??????????? ???? ???? ????? ???????? ??????????? ???????? ??? ???????????? ??? ?????
further att?????????????????????????????????? million bags that was ?as much as Kenya produced
?????????????55 a figure that reached 52 million bags by the close of 1962.56 Brazil was using
52 EAS,?????????????????????????????????-????????????????????????????-chair????, 21 September 1961.
53 EAS, ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????, 14 March 1962.
54 EAS,???????????????????????????????????????-?????????????? ????, 21 June 1961.
55 EAS,?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????, 13 April 1962.
56 KNA, ???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
1962.
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this coffee mountain to browbeat and intimidate the smaller producers into line behind its
policies and domination of the ICO.????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
impelling sharp changes in class relations within the country as it moved closer to
independence.57
At the 1962 International Coffee Conference, a five-year agreement was reached
whereby Kenya was bound to retain 12 percent of its total crop. The international export
quota for 1962-63 was fixed by the conference at 45 million bags thereby adding another 8
million?????? ????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????
was at the expense of aggravating the crisis of overproduction. Whereas under previous
agreements the East African territories shared a single quota, Kenya now had its own quota
fixed at 30,000 tons a year. However its crop estimate during the 1962-63 season was 38,000
tons, 11,000 tons more that the previous season from which there was an unsold surplus of
?????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????? ???????
10,000 tons of these stocks were to be disposed of locally and onto non-quota markets, though
at a ?substantial reduction? on the price obtained from sales to quota markets.58 Overall a
much tighter margin would result all round, with a lower average rate of profit when sales to
quota and non-quota markets were combined.59 In the previous four seasons the average price
on local markets had been approximately £52 a ton, one-sixth of the price obtained on quota
markets, and the average price obtained on non-quota markets approximately £150 per ton,
giving a combined average of £75 per ton.60 Such a low price acted as a drag on the much
higher average price attained by coffee sold on quota markets.
??????? ???? ?????? ?????? ???? ???????? ??????? ??????? ?? ?????? ?????? ??? ??? ???? ????? to
substantially increase the volume and price of its sales in non-quota markets, the Verjee
Tribunal, which investigated the avalanche of coffee plantation strikes brought on by
declining world prices,61 believed that the industry would ?be placed in a dangerously
????????????????????.62 Its implications for the rate of profit were illustrated by the figures
shown below, presented to the 1962 Verjee Tribunal by the general manager of Socfinaf,
??????????????????????????????????????????63
57 David N. Hyde, ?Plantation Struggles in Kenya: trade unionism on the land 1945-65?, Ph.D thesis, School of
Oriental and African Studies, 2000.
58 KNA, AMC 7/20: Arbitrator [Jimmy Verjee] Report, November 1962.
59 The non-quota areas were low consumption markets in the low per capita income countries of Eastern Europe
and East Asia.
60 KNA, AMC 7/20: Arbitrator [Jimmy Verjee] Report, November 1962. Of course the average price was subject
to fluctuations: 568 tons were sold at the Nairobi coffee auction on 5 February 1963 at an average price of
£310.91 a ton. The cumulative sales for the season were 19,562 tons at an average of £318.47 per ton. A total
417 tons of non-quota coffee averaged at £194.08 per ton (EAS,?????????????????????6 February 1963).
61 Hyde (2000). The essence of this was a systematic attempt to rationalise production by applying the methods
of so-??????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????
and calculation of production. Both were attempts to widen profit margins, compressed by competition and
falling prices.
62 KNA, AMC 7/20: Arbitrator [Jimmy Verjee] Report, November 1962.
63 The company owned 12 estates spread over 37,960 acres (including 5,402 acres planted coffee).
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Table 1 ? Coffee sales to quota, non-quota and local markets showing tonnages and the
average price per ton as at 1962
Sales Tonnage Price
Quota markets 30,000 £300
Local 1,200 £52.5
Non-quota markets 9,800 £150
Total 41,000
Average price per ton £257
To avoid suffocation under a mountain of cumulative surpluses, the Verjee Tribunal
urged that ?no effort should be spared? to promote sales in non-quota markets.64 Nonetheless,
this could only be a short run solution since all world producers were competing in non-quota
markets as well. The crisis-torn tendencies of the industry ultimately necessitated the
withdrawal, and annihilation, of vast quantities of coffee from the world market, with dire
consequences for farmers and workers, in order to create an equilibrium between buyers and
sellers. As the unity of the phases of production and exchange forcefully asserted itself, the
erstwhile artificial separation of these departments crumbled allowing only the strongest
competitors to survive.
During 1961, Kenyan premium grade coffees rose by £28 to an average price of £348
a ton. As a result Kenyan coffee lost not only recently gained markets in Holland and Sweden.
Further ground was also lost in Britain. The survival of the coffee industry now seemed to
hang la????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????most important
buyer?. Already menaced by EEC regulations, its loss would spell ruin for thousands of
growers.65 ????? ????? ??? ?? ?????????????????? ??????? ??????????????? ?increasing far more
???????? ????? ???? ??????? ???????? prompting ????????? ???????? over new plantings.66 These
restrictions were occasioned by the ICO??? ??????? ?????? ???? ?????? ??????? ??? ??????? ?????
against a crop estimate of around 38,000 tons, with substantial future increases predicted by
the CBK. The board pointed out that Kenya was on course to exceed its export quota to the
traditional high priced markets by more than 20 percent and that efforts to unload this surplus
onto non-quota markets would cost the planter ?quite a lot of money?.67
Renewed concerns over quality surfaced with signs that German roasters ?were
turning away? from Kenya coffees, a trend that came to fruition in November 1962 when
Schweggmann and Co., agents for East African coffees in Bremen, confirmed that ??????
German coffee roasters were ??????????? Kenya coffee in their blends anymore because of the
drop in quality.68 They complained that ?the well known attributes of fine liquoring Kenya
64 KNA, AMC 7/20: Arbitrator [Jimmy Verjee] Report, November 1962.
65 EAS, ????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????28 July 1962.
66 EAS, ?????????????????????????-?????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????, 22 November 1962.
67 EAS,?????????????????????????worlds best???1 December 1962.
68???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
much greater pressure to fulfil their picking tasks [see main body of thesis]. There had been persistent problems
during the Emergency as the employment of female and child labour was extended to fill the huge gap in the
workforce left by the detention and restrictions placed upon the employment of Kikuyu males. The changes in
working practices introduced by the employers led to a much more intense working day and there is wide
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coffees - flavour and acidity are rarely seen today?.69 At this point Kenya was exporting half
its crop to Germany, though ?only a few buyers are involved and should they change their
mind the export situation could change in a few days??????????? ?????????????? ?????????????
the verge of slipping away as German buyers were unwilling to pay high prices under
conditions of declining quality and were looking at other suppliers. There were several
reasons for the drop in quality. Coffee growers had suffered bad weather for the three
previous seasons and there was a marked tendency amongst growers to allow their trees to
overbear.70 Then there was a widespread incidence of casual field workers picking unripe
green cherry to make up a ?debe??71 in response to low picking rates and rationalised working
practices.
Quotas and the Straitjacket of National Production
????? ???? ????????? ??? ???? ???????? ??????? ?????????? ????? ?????? ????? ?????????? ??? ???
internationally agreed quota system, the remaining problems were forced more and more into
national straitjackets, leading in Kenya to the restructuring of the industry and the
displacement of the settlers. The global crisis was passed onto the colonial government in
Kenya to deal as the CBK internally policed the quota system.72 Due to restrictions on
planting imposed under the ICA, increases in coffee production were sought from increased
productivity because of imposed constraints on additional acreage coming into bearing, which
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Swynnerton Plan. This
disabled any long term development policy to encourage farmers to plant and produce more
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of expansion of production but of careful limitation and quality control. Under conditions
imposed on Kenya by the quota system, the government had an overriding interest in being
seen to pursue the stringent limitation of all new coffee planting, and indeed, were it possible,
the reduction of existing acreage.
Increased productivity did not mean getting more cherries per tree, because the quota
system operated on the basis of the amount of coffee which could be sold in quota markets
and not on the number of trees or acres planted. The increased productivity that concerned the
government was not, therefore, an increase in the tonnage of clean coffee, but maintaining and
if possible raising the traditionally high quality of Kenya coffee in order to gain the best
possible return on a fixed tonnage. However the periodic incidence of Coffee Berry Disease
(CBD), which increased during the 1960s, led to falls in production, giving rise to variable
need to increase the total output of Kenya coffee estates and small holdings.
evidence of picking tasks only being fulfilled by the widespread picking of unripe berries thus undermining the
crops reputed quality.
69 EAS, ????????????????????????????1 August 1963.
70 EAS, ?????????????????????????????, 5 November 1962.
71 ????????????-gallon paraffin tins that had become a universal water-vessel?? ??????????????????? ????????
(Elspeth Huxley, The Flame Trees of Thika: Memories of an African Childhood, London: The Reprint Society,
1960, p.9). These were capable of carrying anything between 6,000 to 18,000 cherries, depending on the size of
the cherry. The average was about 8,000 per debe or 4 million cherries per ton. The differences were accounted
for by the weight and size of the cherry. Sometimes, with excess of rain, the cherry or the pulp was bigger or
thicker. With less rain, the bean or kernel was smaller. Overall, there was rough average of 550 debes to the ton.
See KNA, AMC 7/20: Arbitrator [Jimmy Verjee] Report, November 1962.
72 Government of Kenya, Development Plan 1966-70, Nairobi: Government Printer, 1966, p.176. As a result,
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
restrictions.
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If Kenya violated the terms of the ICA it would lay itself open to penalties including a
quota reduction. Whilst coffee surpluses could be off loaded in non-quota markets this was at
prices which were at best 30 percent below quota-market levels. The Department of
???????????? ????????? ????? ???????? ?????????? ????? ?best served by keeping the non-quota
surplus as small as possible, while at the same time controlling and upgrading cherry quality
to preserve the domination by Kenya arabica of the lucrative mild coffee market?.73
When Kenya joined the ICO in 1966, even though it was already an ICA signatory the
?????????? ?????? ???? ?????? ??? ??????? ????, but by March 1967 it had already been cut to
41,085 tons. The crop for the 1966-67 season, however, amounted to just under 55,000 tons,
leaving some 20 percent of the entire output to be sold on non-quota markets at lower prices.
The overproduction was the result of the extremely rapid expansion of African coffee growing
in the early sixties, with African coffee acreage trebling between 1961 and 1967 to about
130,000 acres compared to the 75,000 acres of estate-grown coffee, most of the latter owned
by white settlers or European-dominated firms.74
Initially African coffee planting standards were carefully controlled by the Department
of Agriculture, but the control system broke down completely in the planting rush of 1963-64,
when notice of intention to restrict planting under the ICA was given to growers. In 1964,
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of 6 percent ? that is, growers were allowed to buy seedlings to replace old or diseased trees
up to 6 percent of their total number of trees, which was cut to 2 percent the following year.
Given these stringent prohibitions, the crux of the problem was enforcement and 1966 the
government established the Coffee Authority, charged with improving and controlling coffee
grown by African co-operative societies.
Tight checks and controls over nurseries and seedlings were imposed. Amongst the
penalties dispensed were the uprooting of illegally planted coffee trees without compensation
and the prosecution of those responsible. Some small scale uprooting of African coffee took
???????????????? ???????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????
in Makuyu, Kiambu and Kitale where thousands of trees on estate nurseries were burned.75
Correlatively, thousands of acres in the estate sector went out of production where a decline
from 80,118 to 75,000 acres took place during the course of 1965-67, while African planted
acreage held fast (see Table 1).
For the 1965-66 season, Kenya was able to achieve an increase in its ICA quota to
750,000 bags that realised a substantial rise in value to more than £19 million as compared
with £14.7 million in the previous year. Despite these gains, production expanded
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????76 Of the total crop
of 47,000 tons for the year ending September 1966, 42,700 tons were sold under the ICA
quota and the rest to non-quota markets. Nonetheless, competition from other producing
countries for non-quota markets was intensifying and Kenya was unable to rely on them to
absorb its surpluses. The trend towards overproduction looked set to continue as African
growers planted out new land under coffee in response to eased restrictions. Anticipating a
73 Government of Kenya (1966), p.177.
74 Kenya Coffee, March 1967, p.92.
75 KNA, Department of Agriculture Press statement, 4 June, 1967. Also monthly issues of Kenya Coffee,
November 1966- June 1967.
76 EAS, ?????????????????????????????, 6 October 1966.
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rise in production to 70,000 tons, the CMB warned that, even with an increased ICA quota, by
1968-69 ?a substantial quantity would be unsaleable overseas?.77
Following independence and well into the sixties, a range of financial impositions
?????????? ??? ?????? ???????? ??? ???????? ??????? ????????78 Resolutions before the annual
coffee conference in January 1965 in Nairobi from mostly European farmers in Kiambu,
?????????????? ?????????? ????????? ???? ??????????? ??? ??????????? ??????? ??????????????? ????
CMB were instructed by the government to levy a 3 percent tax for the assistance of county
council finances,??????????????????????????????????intolerable burden on an industry already
penalised by selective taxation which will act as a deterrent to the efficient high acre yield
????????, whilst planters in Kabete were indignant that ?cess is discriminatory, unjust and
economically unsound?.79 The Kiambu delegates requested the CBK to align cess payments
to the normal rating method based on land values and improvements. The conference released
?? ?????????? ???????? ????? ???????? ??????????? ????? ???? ??????????? ???????? ?????? ????? ????
situation ?precarious if the world price of our coffee drops?. Opposition to cess payments was
also forthcoming from delegates representing 100,000 mostly small scale African coffee
farmers, attending the sixth conference of the Kenya Planters Co-operative Union, worried
that cess would imperil their slender profit margins and ?cause a reduction in quantity and
quality?.80 The conference appointed a committee to approach the government and ?to protest
at the cess on an already overburdened industry?. Overall, the industry was at its limits,
overburdened with deductions totalling £28 a ton, including export tax, ICO contributions and
a CBK Levy.
Exactions aside, growers were fighting a battle on another front with Coffee Berry
Disease (CBD), which continued to take a heavy toll when, during 1964-?????????????????????
totalled just 38,000 tons against an estimate of 45,000 tons. The CBK highlighted the impact
of disease, heavy taxation, the incidence of drought and a low rate of profit as the ?????????
????????? facing growers ??ea????? ????? ??? ??????? ?????? ??????. Large numbers of African
producers on the upper slopes of the Aberdares and Mount Kenya, where CBD was most
prevalent, had uprooted their trees and opted for tea cultivation because of their
disillusionment with the co-operative societies over continued low payments.81 These
problems combined and came to ahead when, during 1967, world overproduction and ICA
quotas impacted harder than ever. There was a marked reduction in the general quality of
Kenya coffee brought on by a lack of funds to carry out necessary production tasks such as
fertilising and spraying. This left the crop vulnerable to recurrent drought and the recurrent
ravages of CBD resulting in losses in the region of 35-40 percent. In face of these problems,
growers were penalised by a very heavy export tax of £20 per ton and the generalised refusal
by the banks to permit them to increase their overdrafts to keep their heads above water.
77 EAS,???????????????????????????????????, 17 November 1965.
78 KNA, AMC 7/20: Arbitrator [Jimmy Verjee] Report, November 1962. By the time of the Verjee tribunal in
December 1962, costs of production were at record levels: ?Once coffee is off the trees, the producer is required
to transport his crop to Nairobi. He is required to pay the Coffee Board an ordinary cess of 1% and a storage of a
¼% per ton, which is £3.21 per ton. He also has to pay the C.M.B. charges in respect of warehousing, insurance,
brokerage, packing and over????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
commission and the charges of the I.C.O., which amount to £1.07 per ton. From the average price per ton
payable to a grower in respect of coffee sold through the C.M.B., there is a total deduction of approximately £10
in respect of the ????????????????????????????????.
79 EAS,???????????????????????????????, 12 January 1965.
80 EAS, ?????????????????????????????????????????????, 12 November 1965.
81 CBK Monthly Bulletin, January 1966.
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Conclusion
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
coffee market. Overproduction and disequilibrium between production and consumption were
the basic phenomenon of this crisis, creating pervasive conditions of flagging accumulation
for producers. In the ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
ICA, was to win new markets and hold onto old ones. The aim was to cut production costs as
far as possible and export the maximum amount of coffee in order to earn badly needed hard
currency. While low prices cut mercilessly into the rate of profit, the Ministry of Agriculture
believed that the continued growth of production stood a chance of offsetting this trend as the
mass of profit expanded. Hence by selling more coffee at depressed prices Kenyan growers
could conceivably arrest the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. In the long term, however,
only a sustained price rise could stave off this tendency for any lengthy period. It was these
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ntraction period.
Under the adverse market conditions of this period the price of coffees was close
enough to the costs of production to put the very future of the industry at risk. European
coffee planters were mostly producing at below their costs of production. The plantation
companies were able to tough out these conditions and save themselves by efficiencies and
their larger economies of scale. The introduction of new technology was evident amongst
some of the better placed planters, a factor which made large scale increases in output
amongst them both possible and necessary if coffee production were to be run at a profit.
These planters were those most likely to survive the enforced transformation of the industry,
whilst others were too strapped to stay the course. The weaker layers of settler coffee capital
were unable to marshal the necessary resources for investment, and restructure themselves to
come through a prolonged period of low prices.
In a bid to restore the conditions for profitability in the industry, and departing from
the need to preserve its tax base, the colonial government was compelled to open the doors to
small scale African farmers and lift the ban on African coffee production in response to the
reverberations of the world market. The issue at stake in the Kenyan coffee industry under
severe external pressures from the global market was the extended reproduction of capital in
the industry. It was here the solution of low cost African coffee farmers came into its own,
though at the expense of displacing many settlers out of production. European growers
encountered severe obstacles to their economic survival in the form of strikes and the superior
performance of African growers. The much lower labour costs of African growers were
attributable to their ownership over the crop, longer working days, more intense working
patterns and their ability to mobilise the labour power of the extended family for a small
return. This made them much better able to bear the burdens of global competition and,
facilitated by the colonial government, they soon threatened to usurp the pre-eminent position
of European farmers. The average rate of profit was pulled below what European growers
could bear by overseas competition and the expansion of African coffee production which
acted in tandem to devalue settler capital. The embryonic landed African bourgeoisie was the
only layer able to make real gains under these conditions, a factor which accelerated the pace
of class formation and social differentiation amongst African farmers themselves.
Abroad, the continuing prospect of the Latin American producers releasing their
surpluses onto the world market threatened a global devaluation of coffee capital. Overall, the
harsh curbings of the world market dictated the necessities to be adjusted to, which were
enforced by the US-backed ICA that exercised great control over the relationship between
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production and circulation. In a crisis of overproduction vast amounts of coffee could not be
sold. Its decisions decided the pace and tempo of development of those countries that were
dependent on coffee to generate the capital resources for their development. This was crucial
for those countries in Africa that had recently gained their independence. In some case its
policies spelled disaster for some sections of capital that were unable to survive a period of
low prices and restrictions on production. Overall, the ICO served to institutionalise, and to
police, ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
To avoid a fall in the rate of profit, and to ensure the expanded reproduction of capital,
the mass of profit had to expand, a tendency that pressed up against the limits of ICA quotas.
Vast surpluses of coffee were withheld from the sphere of circulation by strict quotas and
were thus unable to undergo the metamorphosis into money and capital.82 The crisis potential
of this situation lay in the increasing separation between purchase and sale, and between
production and circulation. This created a dysfunctional circuit of accumulation endangering
the reproduction of coffee capital. Beyond fulfilling quotas, non-quota markets were the only
alternative route for absorbing surpluses.
The compelling motive for all was the self expansion of capital, but under conditions
where markets were shrinking. This was evidenced by an increasingly tense struggle between
coffee producers to gain larger quotas for themselves. Beneath the ICO veil of equality a few
oligopolistic producer states moved to reduce or eliminate entirely the competition of their
rivals. These relationships were reproduced between the producers within Kenya itself as
price rigging and grading scams became evident. European planters endeavoured to
manipulate the structures and mechanisms of the CMB and the CBK to keep their rivals
amongst African farmers well to the rear. The unspoken aim was to manoeuvre European
coffee into the higher quality grade bands that could be sold within designated quota markets,
leaving the lower grades reserved for African farmers, to be dumped for a song on non-quota
markets. In the run up to independence and beyond, these relationships, far from withering
away, became more oppressive and widespread as well-to-do African farmers replaced
dwindling number of settler coffee farmers and used their influence to bias co-operative
resources towards their farms at the expense of others.
82 Karl Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, Part II, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1969, p.509.
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